This paper examines whether government ideology has influenced the allocation of public 
Introduction
Investigating the determinants of public spending is one of the prominent topics of Public Economics. While previous research has focused on the size of government, many scholars have recently also investigated the composition of public expenditures. Political institutions have been shown to be important determinants of budget composition. LagoPeñas and Lago-Peñas (2009), for example, show that party linkage or the nationalization of party systems (as measured by the effective number of parties at the national level in relation to the effective number at the district level) has influenced budget composition in 18 Western European countries in the period . The reason is that in weakly nationalized party systems, sub national parties are important veto players that impede changes in the national budget composition. In Argentina, presidents have distributed capital expenditures (the more flexible item of the National Budget) to their home provinces and provinces administered by governors affiliated with their party (Bercoff and Meloni 2009) . By contrast, globalization has hardly influenced budget composition (Dreher et al. 2008a , 2008b , Sanz and Velázquez 2007 , Gemmell et al. 2008 , Shelton 2007 . The influence of government ideology on the composition of public spending, on the other hand, has been completely ignored in cross national studies. Scholars have investigated how government ideology has influenced the composition of public expenditures at the state level in federal states such as Canada (e.g., Kneebone and McKenzie 2001) or Germany (e.g., Potrafke 2011a). Given the importance of ideology-induced preferences in designing government budgets, this is a surprising omission.
Another reason for manipulating the budget are electoral considerations. In this paper, however, I will focus on the influence of government ideology and do not investigate electoral cycles (see, e.g., Vergne 2009 , Katsimi and Sarantides 2010) .
Budgets are often considered to represent government programs in numbers. The revenues and the need to service predetermined budget positions notwithstanding, each government can choose its spending priorities. Governments are not able to change budgets completely, of course. Path dependence and long-run spending commitments influence public expenditures (see, for example, Rose´s 1990 "inheritance before choice" in public policy).
The composition of the budget will however reflect the preferences of the government and its constituencies. Leftwing and rightwing governments are expected to place emphasis on different budget positions with a view to gratifying their clientele. 2 Many scholars have investigated how government ideology influences the size of government as measured by the government budget in OECD panels, but they have not examined the composition of the budget. To be sure, I acknowledge that Bräuninger (2005) introduces a partisan model of government expenditures and provides empirical evidence for the period 1971-1999, distinguishing only two expenditure categories. His results suggest that the actual spending preferences of parties matter, but these preferences do not appear to be governed by a clear-cut left-right alignment. Evaluating whether leftwing and rightwing governments set other budget priorities requires analyzing many expenditure categories that mirror various policy fields. The more comprehensive the classifications of government expenditure, the higher the probability that policy effects remain undetected.
In this paper, I employ the COFOG (Classification of the Functions of Government) classifications of government functions. I analyze the dataset by Sanz and Velázquez (2007) that covers the period 1970-1997 , and a more recent OECD dataset covering the period 1990-2006 in order to examine whether government ideology had an influence on the allocation of public expenditures. The results suggest that government ideology has had a rather weak influence on the composition of government budgets. Leftist governments, however, increased spending on "Public Services" in the period 1970-1997 and on "Education" in the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . These findings imply, first, that government ideology hardly influenced budgetary affairs in the last decades, and thus, if ideology plays a role at all, it influences non-budgetary affairs. Second, education has become an important expenditure category for leftist parties to signal their political visions to voters belonging to all societal groups.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses theoretical and empirical studies on the partisan approach and budget composition. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 specifies the empirical model. Section 5 reports and discusses the estimation results, and investigates their robustness. Section 6 concludes.
Government ideology and budget composition
Politicians' behavior is expected to affect economic policy. The political business cycle and partisan theories indicate how politicians will influence economic outcomes. 3 The partisan approach focuses on the role of party ideology and shows to what extent leftwing and rightwing politicians can pursue different policies that reflect the preferences of their partisan constituencies. Leftist parties appeal more to the labor base and promote expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, whereas rightwing parties appeal more to capital owners, and are therefore more concerned with reducing inflation. This holds for both branches of the partisan theory -for the classical approach (Hibbs 1977) and for the rational approach (Alesina 1987).
For empirical evaluations of the partisan theories see, e.g., Alesina et al. (1997 ), Sakamoto (2008 ), Heckelman (2002 ), Tavares (2004 ), Bjørnskov (2008a ), Potrafke (2011b In addition to determining the size of the budget, parties also determine the allocation of specific government spending with a view to gratifying their clientele (Bräuninger 2005, Drazen and Eslava 2010) . A key difference between leftwing and rightwing parties concerns their different views on taxation, public good provision and income redistribution. Individuals 3 One implication of the political business cycle theories (Nordhaus 1975 and Rogoff and Sibert 1988, among others) is that all politicians will implement the same expansionary economic policy before elections. For theoretical enhancements and empirical evaluations see, for example, Shi and Svensson (2006) or Angelopoulos and Economides (2008) . 4 Yet there is no conclusive empirical evidence that leftist governments in fact promote more expansionary policies. The results by Alt and Lassen (2006) , for example, suggest that right-wing governments tend to have higher deficits than left-wing governments.
with a high income and high skills, which are associated with rightwing parties, are expected to lobby for public expenditures spent on public good provision, just in order to prevent public money from being spent on transfers. In a similar vein, individuals with a low income and low skills, which are associated with leftwing parties, are expected to lobby against public expenditures on public good provision, because it implies a reduction of direct income transfers (Bierbrauer 2009 have however been shown to spend more on social welfare than leftwing governments. This is because rightwing governments are forced to compensate for the lack of public trust by being even more generous than leftwing governments (Jensen 2010). All that notwithstanding, I
hypothesize that leftwing government favor higher total social spending.
In a similar vein, leftist governments are expected to increase the role of government in health policy and therefore increase public health expenditures. Immergut (1992: 1) describes how politicians implement different health policies and comes to the following conclusion: "National health insurance symbolizes the great divide between liberalism and socialism, between the free market and the planned economy…Political parties look to national health insurance programs as a vivid expression of their distinctive ideological profiles and as an effective means of getting votes National health insurance, in sum, is a highly politicized issue. " De Donder and Hindricks (2007) examine the political economy of
social insurance policy and demonstrate that in a two party model, the leftwing party proposes more social insurance than the rightwing party. The rightwing party attracts the richer individuals, and those with smaller health risks, and the leftwing party attracts the poorer individuals, and those with higher health risks.
By contrast, Jensen (2011a) argues that in modern welfare states, both leftwing and rightwing parties expand public health spending. While previous studies have established theories how leftwing governments extend the public health system and considered rightwing governments only as counterparts to leftwing governments, Jensen (2011a) explicitly develops a theory how rightwing governments implement health policies. Rightwing governments face the following dilemma: they need to consider the pro-public preferences of the important middle-class voters and the preferences of the pro-private preferences of the high-income voters. Moreover, in almost all industrialized countries except the United States, compulsory public health systems have been established. A majority of the voters appears to be strictly against severe cuts in the public health system. 5 Rightwing governments are expected to solve this dilemma by a strategy called "marketization via compensation". This strategy consists of two components. First, rightwing governments match health policies of the political left and keep public health spending at a quite high level. Second, rightwing governments actively encourage and financially support private market health care such as 5 After overall public spending had increased in the course of the recession in the beginnings of the 1980s, the rightwing governments lead by Margret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan eventually curbed social transfers and cut public spending on capital formation and industrial subsidies. Spending on social affairs, however, was not reduced. (Boix 1998: 192) explains this strategy as follows: "Strict electoral calculations partially explain the Conservatives' conscious rejection of any substantial reduction in core welfare programs to achieve their overall goal of lower public expenditure. Popular support for the welfare state was just too strong."
indirect support of private health insurance. The empirical results by Jensen (2011a Jensen ( , 2011b and Potrafke (2010a) Education spending can be distinguished in spending on lower and higher education.
An extension of the Boix model therefore predicts that leftwing governments increase spending on primary and secondary education and decrease spending on tertiary education.
The reason is that the traditional clientele of leftwing parties such as workers profit more from spending on primary and secondary education than on tertiary education. In the German
Laender, for example, leftwing governments have somewhat increased spending for schooling, whereas rightwing governments have increased spending for universities (Potrafke . Christian Democratic parties will naturally put a higher priority on financing churches than Social Democratic parties do.
Data
There is yet no single dataset that classifies public expenditures of the general government by so called COFOG The examined data are public expenditures classified by so called COFOG in both cases, but they differ in some respects. First, Sanz and Velázquez (2007) combined the two categories of the original classification "General public services" and "Public safety and order" into one category named "Public services". I proceed in the same way for the second dataset from 1990 to 2006 to make the results more comparable. Hence, this expenditure category refers to the provision of publicly provided goods. Second, the new OECD classification includes a category called "Environmental protection". 14 This classification 11 The data refer to the general government. Hence, I am unfortunately unable to distinguish between the different jurisdictions in the single countries and take the institutional background into account. In the robustness tests section I comment on results when federal states are excluded. 12 For Germany there are missing data on some control variables. 13 There are also data for South Korea from 1996 to 2005. However, South Korea is a presidential system, so that the current analysis of the political variables is not applicable. 14 Most of the expenditures for "Environmental protection" were classified via "Housing" due to the former categorization.
differs from previous ones, and thus, the category "Environmental protection" is not included in the dataset by Sanz and Velázquez (2007) . Instead, Sanz and Velázquez (2007) 
The empirical model
The estimated base-line dynamic panel data model has the following form:
∆ln Public expenditure category ijt = α Ideology it + Σ l β l ∆ln X ilt + γ ∆ln Public expenditure category ijt-1 + η i + ε t + u ijt with j = 1,…, 10; l=1,…,7
where the dependent variable "∆ln Public expenditure category ijt " denotes the growth rate of expenditure category j as a share of GDP. I distinguish between nine expenditure categories and also consider total spending (as a share of GDP) as a further equation, so that there are ten equations in total. Panel unit root tests show that the growth rates of the expenditure categories are stationary. Ideology it describes the ideological orientation of the respective government. In the next paragraph I describe this variable and its coding in detail. "Σ l ∆ln X ilt " contains seven exogenous control variables. I follow the related studies to include: the 15 It is important to note that Spain, Portugal and Greece became democracies in the mid seventies. This explains the somewhat smaller sample size of the ideology variables.
growth rates of the total population, the share of the young population (aged 14 and below as a share of total population), the share of the elderly population (aged 65 and above as a share of total population), per capita income (in real terms), international trade as share of GDP, prices of public consumption (Tridimas 2001) , and the unemployment rate. Thus, the demographic development, the general economic situation, the openness of the economy, inflation and the situation of the labor market are taken into account. "∆ln Public expenditure category ijt-1 " describes the lagged dependent variable. Lastly, η i represents a fixed country effect, ε t is a fixed period effect and u ijt describes an error term. Table   1 show that government ideology has hardly influenced the growth of public expenditures in the period 1970-1997. First, the results report that leftist governments did not significantly extend the overall public sector. The coefficient of the ideology variable in column 1 does not turn out to be statistically significant. This finding could be driven by compensating effects and governments could have set other budget priorities. The results in Table 1 , however, do not support this claim: leftist governments only increased expenditures on "Public services"
Basic results
(column 2) and therefore, afforded more publicly provided goods than rightwing governments. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. Its numerical meaning is that a corresponding increase of the ideology variable by one point -say from 3 (leftist and 16 I choose the Blundell-Bond (1998) estimator as the initial estimator with which the instruments are collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2006) . This procedure makes sure to avoid using invalid and too many instruments (see rightwing parties in government) to 4 (leftwing government) -would increase the growth rate of public expenditures for "Public services" by about 1.1%. However, I expected leftist governments to spend less for "Defense" and "Cultural affairs" and more for "Housing", as well as "Health" and "Social welfare" (traditional party cleavage). The results do not fulfill these prospects and they do not just reflect the fact that the influenced expenditures are more elastic in the short run and not subject to long run contracts such as defense.
The control variables mostly display the expected sign. For example, the negative elasticities of real per capita income corroborate that, in recessions, the government will provide compensating demand by government expenditures. The estimated coefficients imply that public expenditures (as a share of GDP) decreased, e.g., by about 0.84% (overall spending, column 1) or by about 1.02% (social welfare, column 10) when the real per capita GDP increased by 1%. Overall, real per capita GDP is statistically significant across the equations. In contrast, the population variables mostly do not turn out to be statistically significant. Interestingly, the elderly share is statistically significant at the 10% level on expenditures on "Education" (Column 9). The estimated coefficient has the expected negative sign and implies that public expenditures on education (as a share of GDP) decreased by about 0.51% when the elderly share increased by 1%. Trade openness does not turn out to be statistically significant across the specifications, except the equation for "Education" (column 9). The negative sign of the coefficient in column 9, however, lacks intuition. Moreover, the results suggest that overall government expenditures (column 1) increased by about 0.13% when the prices of public consumption increased by 1% and by about 0.015% when the unemployment rate increased by 1%. Overall, the impacts of the control variables are similar elasticities in the interval between about 1 and even 3 with respect to expenditures on "Defense" (column 3). 
Robustness of the results

I checked
Conclusions
Government ideology has had a rather weak influence on the composition and the size of governments' budgets in OECD countries. Leftist governments, however, increased Why is it that in times of declining electoral cohesion education policy appears to emerge as a central policy field that attracts attention of various societal groups? Equality of opportunity has always been a concern in the political debate but has for a long time been overshadowed by equality of distribution. Since direct income redistribution is no longer feasible, equality of opportunity takes a centre stage position. As far as education policy is concerned, it is well known that the family background has an important influence on the return to education. Even university students with a minority background and from schools located in economically disadvantaged areas, are likely to be academically less successful (Betts and Morrell 1999) . For this reason, unprivileged citizens are in favor of higher public education expenditures with the consequence that leftist parties will focus on this policy field to gratify their original constituencies and, for example, try to reduce income inequality (on distributional effects of public education expenditures see, for example, Sylwester 2002 and Tsakloglou and Antoninis 1999). In the course of trying to become more broadly-based, leftist parties also vie to attract middle-class voters who also prefer higher public education spending. Working middle-class parents are in favor of publicly provided full-time child care
and university education. Core constituents of rightwing parties will support high public education expenditures if they can be convinced that such a policy generates higher tax revenues and lower social transfers in the future.
In contrast to direct income redistribution via the welfare system (social security, public health system or unemployment benefits), the entire electorate tends to benefit from a higher education level of the society. Leftwing parties that have moved to the right are therefore likely to focus exactly on education policy to attract voters from all societal groups:
to be sure, their traditional constituency profits most from higher public education expenditures, but education policy is not likely to alienate other potential voters. Rightwing governments do not entirely adjust because they still favor private alternatives. Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 30 [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Dynamic bias corrected estimator. Dependent variable: Growth rates of the expenditure categories (measured as a share of GDP).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dynamic bias corrected estimator. Dependent variable: First differences of the expenditure categories (measured as a share of GDP).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 32 Data description and sources GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant US dollars.
Worldbank (2007) Trade
Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services received from the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude labor and property income (formerly called factor services) as well as transfer payments. Data are in constant local currency.
Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the world. Population aged between 15 and 64 as a share of total population Worldbank (2007) Variables description (continued).
Variable Description Source
KOF Index of Globalization
The KOF Index of Globalization was introduced in 2002 (see Dreher, 2006) . The overall index covers the economic, social and political dimensions of globalization. It defines globalization to be the process of creating networks of connections among actors at multi-continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital and goods. Globalization is conceptualized as a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and governance and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence. More specifically, the three dimensions of the KOF index are defined as: ♦ economic globalization, characterized as long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges; ♦ political globalization, characterized by a diffusion of government policies; and ♦ social globalization, expressed as the spread of ideas, information, images and people.
Dreher (2006), Dreher et al. (2008b) 
